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Abstract
This paper establishes a general equivalence between discrete choice and rational
inattention models. We show that the choice probabilities emerging from any random
utility discrete choice model can be obtained from a class of suitably generalized rational
inattention models, and vice versa. Thus any discrete choice model can be given an
interpretation in terms of boundedly rational behavior. The underlying idea is that the
surplus function of a discrete choice model has a convex conjugate that is a generalized
entropy (which is a suitable generalization of the Shannon entropy funcion). These
generalized entropies are used to construct an information cost function for a generalized
rational inattention model. We denote this class of rational inattention problems as
Generalized Entropic Rational Inattention (GERI) models.
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1 Motivation
Rational inattention has become an important paradigm for modelling boundedly rational
behavior in many areas of economics (Sims, 2010). In this note we develop a general
equivalence between discrete (multinomial) choice and rational inattention models. This
∗First draft: December 22, 2016. We thank Marcus Berliant, Mark Dean, and Ryan Webb for useful
comments. Alejandro Robinson Cortes provided research assistance.
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2extends a connection between rational inattention and the multinomial logit model derived
by Matejka and McKay (2015). This is important for several reasons. First, we show that
the connection with discrete choice models is a typical feature of the rational inattention
model, and that the Matejka and McKay (2015) result is a specific example. Second,
given the empirical relevance of discrete choice models, it is useful to know that a rational
inattention model can generate the same choice probabilities as any particular discrete choice
model. Moreover, by exploiting convex analytic properties of the discrete choice model, we
show a “duality” between the discrete choice and rational inattention models in the sense
of convex conjugacy. This yields new insights into the structure of the rational inattention
model. More specifically, we utilize a class of “generalized entropy” functions (Fosgerau
and de Palma, 2016) to generalize the information cost function in the rational inattention
model in a manner leading to choice probabilities that are consistent with discrete choice
models; this connection results in model with tractable choice probabilities, which facilitates
their analysis and use in empirical applications. We denote this class of rational inattention
problems as Generalized Entropic Rational Inattention (GERI) models.1
Despite this equivalence, however, random utility discrete choice models and rational inat-
tention models are not the same (as pointed out by Matejka and McKay (2015), Caplin,
Dean, and Leahy (2016)). We also characterize the full solution of the rational inattention
model with our generalized information cost function, and highlight important distinct fea-
tures of choice under rational inattention, including the possibility that some options may
be chosen with zero probabilities, and that a certain “regularity” property that random
utility discrete choice models may not hold for a rational inattention model.
In Section 2 we start with the random utility discrete choice model, and introduce the
class of generalized entropy functions. Section 3 introduces the rational inattention model.
We show how the generalized entropy functions can be used to model the information cost
function in the rational inattention model. Section 4 presents the equivalence between
choice probabilities emerging from the discrete choice model, and those emerging from the
rational inattention model based on the generalized entropy functions. In Section 5 we
characterize the full solution of the rational inattention model, and highlight important
differences vis-a-vis the discrete choice model. Section 6 concludes.
1This complements work by He´bert and Woodford (2016), who also consider generalizations of the infor-
mation cost function.
32 Discrete choice model
Consider a decision-maker (DM) making discrete choices among a set of i = 1, . . . , N
options, where, for each option i, the utility is given by
ui = v˜i + i, (1)
where v˜ = (v˜1, . . . , v˜N ) is deterministic and  = (1, . . . , N ) is a vector of random utility
shocks. This is the classic additive random utility framework pioneered by McFadden
(1978).
Assumption 1. The random vector  = (1, . . . , N ) follows a joint distribution that is
absolutely continuous, independent of v˜, and fully supported on RN for j = 1, . . . , N .
An important concept in this note is the surplus function of the discrete choice model (so
named by McFadden, 1981), defined as
W (v˜) = E(max
i
[v˜i + i]). (2)
As it well-known, W (v˜) is convex and differentiable. In particular, under assumption 1, the
choice probabilities can be expressed as:
∂W (v˜)
∂v˜i
= qi(v˜) ≡ P (v˜i + i ≥ v˜j + j , ∀j 6= i) for i = 1, . . . , N.
This is the Daly-Zachary-Williams theorem, famous in the discrete choice literature (Mc-
Fadden, 1978, 1981).
When the i’s are distributed i.i.d. across options i according to the type 1 extreme value
distribution, then the resulting choice probabilities take the well-known multinomial logit
form: qi(v˜) = e
v˜i/
∑
j e
v˜j . Assumption 1 above leaves the distribution of the ’s unspecified,
thus allowing for choice probabilities beyond the multinomial logit case.
We begin by defining a vector-valued function H(·) = (H1(·), ...,HN (·)) : RN+ → RN+ as the
gradient of the exponentiated surplus, i.e.
Hi(e
v˜) = ∇v˜i
(
eW (v˜)
)
. (3)
We next present two results from Fosgerau and de Palma (2016) that provide a general
4expression for choice probabilities in discrete choice models, and connect that to a class of
generalized entropies with corresponding generating functions.
Proposition 1. The choice probabilities for the discrete choice model take the form
qi(v˜) =
Hi
(
ev˜
)∑N
j=1Hj (e
v˜)
, ∀i, (4)
and the surplus function is
W (v˜) = log
[∑
i=1
Hi
(
ev˜
)]
. (5)
The function H is globally invertible.
This proposition shows that the choice probabilities emerging from a random utility discrete
choice model have a “logit-like” structure (4), expressed in terms of the function H(·) that
is related to the surplus function W (v˜).
Fosgerau and de Palma (2016) consider functions defined by
S(q) = H−1(q). (6)
Any function S defined in this way has a number of useful properties, summarized in the
following proposition. Let ∆ denote the unit simplex in RN .
Proposition 2. Let assumption 1 hold. Then the vector valued-function S(q) defined by
(6) satisfies the following conditions.
(i) S is continuous and homogenous of degree 1.
(ii) q · logS(q) is convex.
(iii) S is differentiable at any q ∈ relint(∆) with :
N∑
i=1
qi
∂ logSi(q)
∂qk
= θ, k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
for θ > 0 a scalar constant invariant across choices k.
(iv) S is globally invertible.
5(v) The convex (Fenchel) conjugate function for the surplus function W (v˜) is
W ∗(q) =
{
q · logS(q) q ∈ ∆
+∞ otherwise,
Note that part (iii) allows us to write −∂(q logS(q))∂qk = logSk(q)+θ, which will be important
in the sequel.
Part (v) establishes a close relationship between the function S(·) and the surplus function
W (v˜) of the corresponding discrete choice model; this relationship is in terms of convex
conjugacy (Rockafellar, 1970, ch. 12). As a leading example, consider the multinomial logit
model. In the multinomial logit model,  is an i.i.d. extreme value type 1 random vector.
Then the surplus W (v˜) = log
(∑N
j=1 e
v˜j
)
and the function S(q) = q is just the identity.
The convex conjugate of the surplus is W ∗(q) = q · logq, which means that −W ∗(q) is just
the Shannon (1948) entropy.
For a general discrete choice model (1) satisfying assumption 1, −W ∗ is then a generalized
entropy. The corresponding function S generates the generalized entropy through Propo-
sition 2(v). Furthermore, by Fenchel’s equality (cf. Rockafellar, 1970, Thm. 23.5), we also
have
W (v˜) = q · v˜ −W ∗(q) (7)
for ∇W (v˜) = q. Note that W (v˜) = ∑Ni=1 qi(v˜)(v˜i + E(i|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i)). Combining this
latter expression with (7), we obtain an alternative expression for the conjugate function2:
W ∗(q) = q · logS(q) = −
∑
i
qiE[i|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i].
This establishes a connection between the generalized entropy function S(q) and the joint
distribution of , the random utility shocks.3
3 Rational inattention
We now introduce the rational inattention model, as presented in Matejka and McKay
(2015) and He´bert and Woodford (2016). The decision maker is again presented with
2See, for instance, Chiong, Galichon, and Shum (2016).
3Additionally, we conjecture that logSi(q) = −E[i|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i] for i = 1, . . . , N , but have not
proved it. For the multinomial logit case, corresponding to S(q) = q, McFadden (1978) showed that
γ − log qi = E[i|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i], for γ being Euler’s constant.
6a group of N options, from which he must choose one. Each option has an associated
payoff v = (v1, ..., vN ), but in contrast to the discrete choice model, the vector of payoffs
is unobserved by the DM. Instead, the DM considers the payoff vector V to be random,
taking values in V ⊂ RN ; for simplicity, we take V to be finite. The DM possesses some prior
knowledge about the available options, given by a probability measure µ(v) = Pr(V = v).
The DM’s choice is represented as a random action A that is a canonical unit vector in RN .
The payoff resulting from the action is V ·A, namely that value of the entry in V indicated
by the action A.
The problem of the rationally inattentive DM is to choose the conditional distribution
Pr(A|V), balancing the expected payoff against the cost of information. At the least infor-
mative extreme, A is independent of V such that Pr(A|V) = Pr(A). At the other extreme,
A identifies the option with maximal payoff.
Intuitively, the rational inattention problem may be described as follows. The DM is en-
dowed with the prior belief µ about the possible realizations of V. Then the DM receives
a signal s on the state V to update his prior belief µ. The joint distribution of priors and
signals define an information strategy with the property that the marginal distribution over
states equals the DM’s prior µ, which ensures that the DM’s posterior beliefs are consistent
with prior. Thus, given these restrictions the DM is only free to choose the conditional
distribution of signals. Finally, the DM maximizes expected payoffs, induced by the joint
distribution of states and signals, minus the information cost. This cost captures the fact
signals may have different degrees of precision.
In general, the presence of signals makes the RI problem a complicated variational problem.
Fortunately, we can use the fact that as each action is associated with a particular signal,
the cost of information is given by the mutual information between states and actions. This
fact allows us to study a RI problem in terms of actions and states.4
According to this, denote an action by i and write pi(v) as shorthand for Pr(A = i|V = v).
The DM’s strategy is a solution to the following variational problem:
max
{pi(·)}
(∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
vipi(v)
)
µ(v)− information cost
)
, (8)
4For further details we refer the reader to Matejka and McKay (2015, pp. 277–280) and He´bert and
Woodford (2016, p.10).
7subject to
pi(v) ≥ 0 , (9)
N∑
i=1
pi(v) = 1 . (10)
The previous literature has used the Shannon entropy to specify the information cost. As
shown by Matejka and McKay (2015), this connects the rational inattention model to the
logit model. We present this connection in the next Section 3.1. Then in Section 3.2 we
extend this by introducing generalized entropy to the problem.
3.1 Shannon entropy and multinomial logit
The key element in the program above is the modelling of information processing. Let
κ(p, µ) denote a function that measures the amount of information processed. It will depend
on the vector of choice probabilities p(v) and the prior beliefs µ.
We denote for convenience the Shannon entropy by Ω(p) = −p · logp. We also use p(v) =
(p1(v), . . . , pN (v)) for the vector of choice probabilities conditional on V = v, while the
expected values of the conditional choice probabilities are denoted p0i = Epi(V) and p0 =
(p01, . . . , p
0
N ).
Matejka and McKay (2015) propose to measure the amount of information processed by
the mutual (Shannon) information between V and the actions A. It may be written as
κ(p, µ) = Ω(E(p(V))− E(Ω(p(V))) (11)
= −
N∑
i=1
p0i log p
0
i +
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
pi(v) log pi(v)
)
µ(v). (12)
Matejka and McKay then specify the information cost as λκ(p, µ) where λ > 0 is the unit
cost of information. The choice strategy of the rationally inattentive DM is the collection
of conditional probabilities p = {pi(v)}Ni=1 that solves the optimization problem
max
{pi(v)}Ni=1
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
vipi(v)
)
µ(v)− λκ(p, µ) (13)
8subject to (9) and (10). The DM solves (16) to find conditional choice probabilities
pi(v) =
p0i e
vi/λ∑N
j=1 p
0
je
vj/λ
for i = 1, . . . , N. (14)
When the prior µ is constant then also the p0i are constant. In this case the rational
inattention model reduces to the multinomial logit model. This is a key observation from
Matejka and McKay (2015).
3.2 Moving beyond Shannon: the Generalized Entropic Rational Inattention
(GERI) models
The goal of this paper is to generalize Matejka and McKay’s equivalence result between
rational inattention and multinomial logit. To achieve that, we replace the Shannon entropy
by the generalized entropy introduced in Section 2 above. This is reasonable for two reasons.
First, generalized entropy leads to information costs with desirable properties. Second, since
each generalized entropy implies a corresponding discrete choice model (Proposition 2), it
turns out that each RI model with an information cost derived from a generalized entropy
will generate choice probabilities consistent with a corresponding discrete choice model
(Proposition 4 below); this implies that any discrete choice model can be microfounded by
a corresponding rational inattention model, thus generalizing substantially a main result in
Matejka and McKay (2015). We discuss each point in turn.
We begin by generalizing the rational inattention framework described above, using gen-
eralized entropy in place of Shannon entropy. Specifically, we let S be the entropy gen-
erator corresponding to some discrete choice model satisfying Assumption 1 and define
ΩS (p) = −p · logS (p) as the corresponding generalized entropy. Accordingly, we define a
general information cost by
κS (p, µ) = ΩS
(
p0
)− EµΩS (p(V)) (15)
= −p0 · logS (p0)+ ∑
v∈V
[p (v) · logS (p (v))]µ (v) .
Accordingly, we consider a generalized class of rational inattention models in which the DM
9chooses the collection of conditional probabilities p = {pi(v)}Ni=1 to optimize
max
{pi(v)}Ni=1
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
vipi(v)
)
µ(v)− λκS(p, µ) (16)
where S corresponds to a discrete-choice model; that is, the function S is defined as S =
H−1 for some H function satisfying Proposition 1. We refer to this class as Generalized
Entropic Rational Inattention (GERI) models.
Before characterizing the solutions of GERI models, we describe some features of the gen-
eralized entropic information cost function.
3.2.1 Properties of κS(p, µ)
The general information cost κS(p, µ), as defined in Eq. (15), possesses certain reasonable
and desirable properties that have been discussed in the existing literature. First, the action
A carries no information about the payoff V when A and V are independent. In that case
the information cost should be zero.
Condition 1. Independence. If A and V are independent, then κS(p, µ) = 0.
Secondly, the mutual Shannon information κ(p, µ) is a convex function of p. This is useful
as it ensures a unique solution to the problem of the rationally inattentive DM. We will
show that the information cost κS(p, µ) has a slightly weaker property, namely that it is
convex on sets where p0 is constant (precisely, sets of mean-preserving choice probability
vectors).
Condition 2. Convexity. For a given µ, the information cost function κS(p, µ) is convex
on any set of choice probabilities vectors satisfying
{
p : V → ∆N | Eµp(V) = p0
}
.
The mutual Shannon information κ(p, µ) satisfies these two properties. The next propo-
sition establishes that the information cost defined in (15) using the generalized entropy
functions also satisfies these properties.
Proposition 3. The information cost defined in Eq. (15) satisfies conditions 1 and 2.
This proposition shows that the generalized information cost (15) retains some desirable
properties from the Shannon-based information cost. The generalized entropy information
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cost function may, however, not satisfy all the properties of information cost functions
discussed in He´bert and Woodford (2016).5 At the same time, our use of the generalized
entropy information cost functions exploits the close connection between generalized entropy
functions and discrete choice models, which allows us to generalize the types of choice
probabilities which can arise in rational inattention models far beyond the multinomial
logit. This is the topic of the remainder of the paper.
3.2.2 Choice probabilities in GERI models
Next, we characterize the choice probabilities for a GERI model.
Proposition 4. Consider a GERI problem in which the DM solves the program
max
{pi(v)}
(∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
vipi(v)
)
µ(v)− λκS(p, µ)
)
, (17)
s.t. (9) and (10). The cost function κS(p, µ) is given by
κS(p, µ) = −
N∑
i=1
p0i logSi(p
0) +
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
pi(v) logSi(p(v))
)
µ(v) (18)
for a generalized entropy function S.
For the set of choices I ⊆ {1, . . . , N} such that p0i > 0 (nonzero prior probabilities), the
conditional choice probabilities satisfy
pi(v) =
Hi(e
(v+logS(p0))/λ)∑
j∈I Hj(e(v+logS(p
0))/λ)
for i ∈ I, (19)
where H = S−1.
Proposition 4 generalizes results in Matejka and McKay (2015); compare Eq. (19) to Eq.
(14). In fact, when S is the identity, Eq. (19) reduces to Eq. (14).
5In particular, we have only been able to prove the “Blackwell dominance” condition (cf. He´bert and
Woodford (2016, pg. 18)) for the generalized entropy information cost functions only under more restrictive
conditions.
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4 Equivalence between discrete choice and rational inattention
In this section we establish the equivalence between discrete choice models and rational
inattention models. In particular, we show that the choice probabilities generated by GERI
model lead to the same choice probabilities as a corresponding choice probabilities from a
discrete choice model. For convenience, we also assume in the remainder of this paper that
λ = 1. This simplifies notation, and results for λ 6= 1 can be derived in a straightforward
manner.
In order to gain some intuition, return to Eq. (1) and define, for each i, the perturbed
valuation
v˜i = vi + logSi(p
0) for i = 1, . . . , N. (20)
It is easy to see that plugging in these valuations in Eq. (3), we obtain the choice probabil-
ities
qi(v˜) =
Hi
(
ev˜
)∑N
j=1Hj (e
v˜)
, ∀i. (21)
This expression is identical to Eq. (19), which is the solution to the GERI problem (17).
Similarly, solving the rational inattention problem (17) we obtain the choice probabilities
(19), which correspond to a discrete choice model with random utilities given by v˜i =
vi + logSi(p
0) for i = 1, . . . , N .
Intuitively we have the following
pi(v) =
Hi(e
v+logS(p0))∑N
j=1Hj(e
v+logS(p0))
=
Hi(e
v˜)∑N
j=1Hj(e
v˜)
= qi(v˜).
It is worth remarking that the priors p0i s must be consistent with the probability measure
µ(v):
p0 =
∑
v∈V
p(v + logS(p0))µ(v). (22)
Proposition 5. Every GERI model yielding strictly positive conditional and prior choice
probabilities for all options i = 1, . . . , N is observationally equivalent to (has identical condi-
tional choice probabilities as) a random utility discrete choice model defined by Eqs. (3),(6),
and (20) satisfying assumption 1. In particular, for each value v ∈ V we have the following:
pi(v) = qi(v˜) for i = 1, . . . , N.
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Proposition 5 establishes that every random utility discrete choice model (1) with surplus
function W is observationally equivalent (i.e. has the same choice probabilities) to a GERI
model with a function S defined by Eqs. (3) and (6).
There is an important caveat to this result, as it holds only for GERI models in which
all the options are chosen with non-zero probabilities. For RI models based on Shannon
entropy, Matejka and McKay (2015) and Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2016) discuss how the
optimal solution is characterized by consideration sets; that is, the DM will optimally set
the prior choice probabilities on some items to zero so that for some i, p0i = 0 and hence
pi(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V. Such zero choice probabilities for certain options represents a point
of departure between discrete choice and rational inattention models; indeed, as stated in
Proposition 5, the equivalence between discrete choice and rational inattention holds only
for the set of choices with strictly positive prior choice probabilities. We turn to this point
next.
5 Solving the GERI model
The previous section has discussed an equivalence between discrete-choice models, and
GERI models, in terms of the choice probabilities which they generate, for the choices
which are chosen with positive probability. However, an important distinction between
discrete choice and GERI models is that in the latter, some options can be chosen with zero
probability, for which the proposition in the previous section does not apply.
In this section, we highlight this feature of the rational inattention model, by considering
the complete solution to the rational inattention model. We begin by using convex-analytic
tools to derive an alternative characterization of the rational inattention problem, and then
characterize some features of the optimizing solution.
Proposition 6. Let assumption 1 hold and let p(v) be a solution to the GERI problem.
Then the following statements hold:
i) The generalized inattention cost function may be written as
κS(p, µ) = W
∗(p0)−
∑
v∈V
W ∗(p(v))µ(v). (23)
ii) The choice probabilities in the GERI model p(v) can also be generated, for each v ∈ V,
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by the problem
max
p∈∆
{
p · (v + logS(p0))−W ∗(p)} . (24)
Eq. (24) provides an alternative pointwise representation of the GERI problem (8).
iii) The optimal value of the GERI program (17) is equal to∑
v∈V
W (v + logS(p0))µ(v). (25)
This proposition characterizes the GERI problem in terms of the convex conjugate proper-
ties of W , the surplus function from the discrete choice model. It also describes a “duality”
between the discrete choice and GERI models, in the sense that the surplus function for
the discrete choice model and the generalized information cost (15) are convex conjugates
to each other.
The complete solution of the rational inattention model in the Shannon entropy/multinomial
logit case, is summarized in Matejka and McKay (2015) and Caplin, Dean, and Leahy
(2016). The analogous procedure for solving the GERI model is provided in Proposition
6. Specifically we can solve the full rational inattention problem by optimizing Eq. (25),
which is
∑
v∈V
µ (v)W
(
v + logS
(
p0
))
=
∑
v∈V
µ (v) log
N∑
i=1
Hi(exp
(
v + logS(p0)
)
)
(the RHS follows from Eq. (5)). We maximize this subject to
N∑
i=1
p0i = 1 and p
0
i ≥ 0 for
i = 1, . . . , N , and use the mathematical convention that 0 log 0 = 0. Then once p0 is known,
the corresponding choice probabilities are given by Eq. (19).
5.1 Optimal consideration sets
We now consider some features of the prior probabilities emerging from the solution to the
full GERI model, as described in the previous section. We begin noticing that the associated
Lagrangean may be written as
L(γ, ξ) =
∑
v
W (v + logS(p0))µ(v)− γ
[
N∑
i=1
p0j − 1
]
+
N∑
i=1
ξjp
0
j ,
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where γ and ξ = {ξi}Ni=1 are the associate Lagrange multipliers.
Then taking first order conditions we get
∑
v
N∑
j=1
pj(v)
∂ logSj(p
0)
∂p0i
+ γ + ξi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N.
Substituting
∑
v pj(v)µ(v) = Eµpj(v) = p0j , we have
N∑
j=1
p0j
∂ logSj(p
0)
∂p0i
+ γ + ξi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N.
For the case of an interior solution p0i > 0, we get ξi = 0 implying that previous condition
becomes
N∑
j=1
p0j
∂ logSj(p
0)
∂p0i
= −γ.
Using Proposition 2(iii), it follows:
θ = −γ
Then we can write down necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal p0. In particular,
for all i, we have
N∑
j=1
p0j
∂ logSj(p
0)
∂p0i
≤ θ,
with equality if p0i > 0.
For the case of the logit and nested logit models we have θ = 1, implying that the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the optimum can be expressed as:6
N∑
j=1
p0j
∂ logSj(p
0)
∂p0i
≤ 1.
By solving the full problem, the optimizing priors may involve zero probabilities for some
of the choices. Obviously, for these choices, the corresponding choice probabilities will also
6 Noting that the logit model is the particular case of S(p0) = p0, these conditions generalize the result
in Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2016, Prop.1).
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be zero for all v. In this way, the rational inattention framework can generate violations
of the “regularity” property which otherwise characterizes additive random utility discrete
choice models (see Example 3 below).7
While the optimal consideration sets emerging from the full solution to this problem is
difficult to characterize, the following proposition describes one important feature of optimal
consideration sets: that they will exclude choices which offer the lowest utility in all states
of the world.
Proposition 7. For some option a, and for all v ∈ V, let va ≤ vi for all i 6= a. Assume
that the valuations are all distinct with positive probability. Then p0a = 0 (that is, option a
is not in the optimal consideration set).
5.2 Examples
Example 1: Multinomial logit. This is the Matejka and McKay example. For a set of
valuations v˜, the multinomial logit choice probabilities are given by:
pi(v˜) =
ev˜i∑N
j=1 e
v˜j
(26)
which arises from a discrete choice model in which the utility shocks  are distributed i.i.d.
according to the Type 1 extreme value distribution.
Using the results above, these choice probabilities (26) are also equivalent to those from a
rational inattention model with the Shannon entropy function, which is the case Si(p) = pi,
for each i, and corresponding valuations
vi = v˜i − log p0i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
Caplin, Leahy, and Matejka (2016) use this equivalence for the estimation of rational
inattention models with Shannon entropy.
Moreover, for this case, we have that the surplus function
W (v˜) = log
∑
i
exp(v˜i) = log
[∑
i
exp(vi) ∗ p0i
]
.
7See also Matejka and McKay (2015, pp. 293ff). The regularity property is that adding an option to a
choice set cannot increase the choice probability for any of the original choices.
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Thus for this case, the alternative representation of the rational inattention program given
in Proposition 5 (Eq. (25)) is:
∑
v∈V
log
[∑
i
exp(vi) ∗ p0i
]
µ(v)
which is analogous to maximization problems derived in Matejka and McKay (2015, Eq.
(14)) and Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2016, Eq. (3)).

Example 2: Nested logit. From an applied point of view, an important implication of
proposition 5 is that it allows us to model complex choice patterns, beyond the multinomial
logit case. In this example, we generate nested logit choice probabilities from a GERI model.
Among applied researchers, the nested logit model of multinomial choice is preferred over
the multinomial logit model because it generates reasonable substitution patterns across
products (and avoids the “red bus/blue bus” pitfall).
Following Fosgerau and de Palma (2016), we partition the set of alternatives i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
into mutually exclusive nests, and let gi denote the nest containing alternative i. Let
ζgi ∈ (0, 1] be nest-specific parameters. For a set of valuations v˜, the nested logit choice
probabilities are given by:
pi(v˜) =
ev˜i/ζgi∑
j∈gi e
v˜j/ζgi
· e
ζgi log
(∑
j∈gi e
v˜j/ζgi
)
∑
all nests g e
ζg log
(∑
j∈g e
v˜j/ζg
) . (27)
As is well-known, the nested logit choice probabilities are consistent with a discrete choice
model in which the utility shocks  are jointly distributed according to a generalized extreme
value distribution.
Using the results above, the nested logit choice probabilities (27) are also equivalent to
those from a GERI model with
Si(p) = p
ζgi
i
∑
j∈gi
pi
1−ζgi (28)
and valuations
vi = v˜i − logSi(p0), i ∈ {1, . . . , n} .
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For this case we have that the surplus function W (v˜) takes the form:
W (v˜) = log
[∑
g
eIg(v˜)/ζg
]
,
where Ig(v) = log
(∑
j∈g e
vj/ζg
)
. Thus for this case, the alternative representation of the
GERI program given in Proposition 5 (Eq. (25)) is:
∑
v∈V
log
[∑
g
eIg(v+S(p
0))/ζg
]
µ(v).
We use the previous closed form expression to find the priors p0. In particular, we solve
the following program:
L =
∑
v∈V
log
[∑
g
eIg/ζg
]
µ(v)− γ
 N∑
j=1
p0j − 1
+ N∑
j=1
ξjp
0
j .
Applying the necessary and sufficient conditions we find that an optimal solution p0 is
characterized by the set of equations:
N∑
j=1
p0j (v)
∂ logSj(p
0)
∂p0i
≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , N,
with equality if pi(v) > 0.

Example 3: zero prior probabilities and failure of regularity.
Next, we consider a fully solved out example illustrating the possibility of zero prior choice
probabilities and failure of regularity, which are results which can happen in the GERI
framework but not in the discrete choice model, and represent an important point of dif-
ference between the two models. Consider a setting with four choices. Table 5.2 lists the
valuation vectors for these four choices in the three equipossible states of the world. We
consider both the multinomial logit and nested logit models. (For the nested logit model,
we assume that nest 1 consists of choices (2,3) with nesting parameter ζ1 = 0.7, and nest 2
consists of choices (1,4) with parameter ζ2 = 0.8.
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State: v1 v2 v3
Choice 1 3 1 3
Choice 2 2 3 3
Choice 3 1 2 2
Choice 4 2 4 2
Table 1: Valuation vectors in Example 3
Model: MN Logit MN Logit Nested Logit Nested Logit
Choice set: {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 3, 4}
p01 0.29 0.51 0.29 0.57
p02 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00
p03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p04 — 0.49 — 0.43
Optimized surplus:
EvW (v + logS(p0)) 2.705 2.865 4.222 6.032
Table 2: Optimal prior probabilities for Example 3
For each model, we compute the optimal prior probabilities first for the choice set {1, 2, 3},
and for the expanded choice set {1, 2, 3, 4}. This example will illustrate how adding choice
4 to the choice set can results in increases in the choice probabilities of choices (1,2,3) thus
showing a failure of the regularity property. The optimal prior probabilities are shown in
Table 5.2. Qualitatively the results are the same between the logit and nested logit specifi-
cations. With the smaller choice set, we see that only choices 1,2 and chosen with positive
probability, essentially leading to a consideration set consisting of only those two choices.
When choice 4 is added, however, then choice 2 drops out of the consideration set, and only
choice 1,4 are chosen with positive probability. This demonstrates a failure of regularity, as
the addition of choice 4 increases the prior choice probability for choice 1. (Moreover, note
that with the expanded choice set, choice 2 is chosen with zero probability, even though it
is not inferior in all states of the world, which demonstrates that the characterization of
consideration sets in Proposition 7 is not exhaustive.)
Basically, the addition of choice 4 allows agents to form an effective “hedge” in conjunction
with choice 1. In the state when choice 1 yields a low payoff (state v2), choice 4 yields a
high payoff; on the contrary, when choice 4 yields a lower payoffs (states v1 and v3), choice
1 yields high payoffs.
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6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we establish a general equivalence between discrete choice and a class of
generalized rational inattention models. In particular, we show that the choice probabilities
emerging from a random utility discrete choice model can be obtained from a suitable
model in the class of Generalized Entropic Rational Inattention (GERI) models, and vice
versa. Thus any discrete choice model can be given an interpretation in terms of boundedly
rational behavior. The underlying idea is that, by exploiting convex analytic properties of
the discrete choice model, we show a “duality” between the discrete choice and GERI models
in the sense of convex conjugacy. Precisely, the surplus function of a discrete choice model
has a convex conjugate that is a generalized entropy. Thus, GERI models are rational
inattention problems in which the information cost functions are constructed from the
convex conjugate functions of discrete-choice models.
A few remarks are in order. First, one difference between rational inattention and discrete
choice models is that some options may be chosen with zero prior probability in the rational
inattention model, which allows for the possibility that the choice probabilities for some
existing choices may increase upon introduction of an additional good, which violates the
regularity property of random utility models.
Second, there is also a connection between the results here and papers in the decision the-
ory literature. The GERI optimization problem (17) bears resemblance to the variational
preferences which Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006) propose to represent ambi-
guity averse preferences, as well as to the revealed perturbed utility paradigm proposed by
Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015) to model stochastic choice behavior. Specifically,
the information cost function in the rational inattention model appears analogous to the
ambiguity aversion indices in the variational preferences, and to the perturbation function in
the perturbed utility representations. The main point in this paper is to establish a duality
between rational inattention models and random utility discrete choice models, which re-
sults in observational equivalence of their choice probabilities, and it seems a similar duality
might arise between discrete choice models and these other models from decision theory.
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Appendix:
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: See Fosgerau and de Palma (2016). 
Proof of Proposition 2: See Fosgerau and de Palma (2016). 
Proof of Proposition 3: Independence: By independence, we have, for all i, pi(v) = ki, a constant.
Then p0i = ki and κ(p, µ) = 0.
Convexity: We want to show that Ω is convex on any set of actions that has constant p0. To prove
this, consider two sets of choice probabilities p1 (v) ,p2 (v) where both have the same implied prior
probabilities p0. For ρ ∈ [0, 1], define pρ as the convexification ρp1 (v) + (1− ρ)p2 (v). Then we
would like to show that
ρκ (p1, µ) + (1− ρ)κ (p2, µ) ≥ κ (pρ, µ) .
But
ρκ (p1, µ) + (1− ρ)κ (p2 µ)− κ (pρ, µ)
=− ρΩ (p1)− (1− ρ) Ω (p2) + Ω (ρp1 + (1− ρ)p1) ,
which is positive by concavity of Ω (p) (cf. Proposition 2(ii)).

Proof of Proposition 4. The program (17) may be written as
L(p, ξ,µ) =
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
k=1
vkpk(v)
)
µ(v)− λ
(
−
N∑
k=1
p0k logSk(p
0) +
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
k=1
pk(v) logSk(p(v))
)
µ(v)
)
+
∑
v∈V
(
n∑
k=1
ξk(v)pk(v)
)
µ(v)−
∑
v∈V
γ(v)
[
n∑
k=1
pk(v)− 1
]
µ(v).
Recalling that p0i =
∑
v∈V pi(v)µ(v) for i = 1, . . . , n, the point-wise first-order condition w.r.t pi(v)
can be written as:
vi − λ
(
− log(Si(p0))−
n∑
k=1
p0k
∂ log(Sk(p
0))
∂p0i
+ log(Si(p(v)) +
n∑
k=1
pk(v)
∂ log(Sk(p(v)))
∂pi(v)
)
+ ξi(v)− γ(v) = 0.
Under condition C3 it follows that
−
n∑
k=1
p0k
∂ log(Sk(p
0))
∂p0i
+
n∑
k=1
pk(v)
∂ log(Sk(p(v)))
∂pi(v)
= −θ + θ = 0.
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Using this fact, the first order condition boils down to
vi + ξi(v)− γ(v) + λ
(
log(Si(p
0))− log(Si(p(v)))
)
= 0.
The previous expression may be rewritten as
λ
(
log(Si(p(v)))− log(Si(p0))
)
= vi + ξi(v)− γ(v).
Then
Si(p(v))
Si(p0)
= e
1
λ (vi+ξi(v)−γ(v)).
Noting that for an interior solution we must have ξi(v) = 0
Si(p(v)) = Si(p
0)e
1
λ (vi−γ(v)).
Under C1 and C4, and defining S = H−1 we find:
pi(v) = Hi(e
(v+logS(p0))/λ) · e−γ(v)λ . (29)
Adding up
N∑
i=1
pi(v) =
N∑
i=1
Hi(e
(v+logS(p0))/λ) · e−γ(v)λ .
It follows then that
e
γ(v)
λ =
n∑
i=1
Hi(e
(v+logS(p0))/λ).
Finally we get
pi(v) =
Hi(e
(v+logS(p0))/λ)∑n
j=1Hj(e
(v+logS(p0))/λ)
.

Proof of Corollary ??. Matejka and McKay (2015) shows that exchangeability assumption,
p0i =
1
N . Using C1 in (19) the result follows at once.
Proof of Proposition 5. First, consider the RI problem (17), and for simplicity assume λ = 1.
Under assumption 2, by proposition 4 we know that there exists a solution to (17). In particular,
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for each value of v, the optimal solution p(v) satisfies:
pi(v) =
Hi(e
v+logS(p0))∑N
j=1Hj(e
v+logS(p0))
for i = 1, . . . , N.
Defining v˜i = vi+logSi(p
0) for i = 1, . . . , N , and under assumption 1, it follows that p(v) = ∇W (v˜).
But latter expression is just p(v) = q(v˜).
Now, lets consider the discrete choice model defined by Eqs. (3),(6). Assuming that assumption 1
holds, we may plug in (20) in Eq. (3) to obtain the choice probabilities:
qi(v˜) =
Hi
(
ev˜
)∑N
j=1Hj (e
v˜)
for i = 1, . . . , N,
=
Hi(e
v+logS(p0))∑N
j=1Hj(e
v+logS(p0))
.
But latter expression corresponds to the solution to the rational inattention problem (17).
Thus we conclude that for all v ∈ V,
pi(v) = qi(v˜) for i = 1, . . . , N.

Proof of proposition 6.
(i) Combining Proposition 2 and Eq. (18), we get (23).
(ii) For each v ∈ V, let q(v˜) be the choice probability vector generated by a discrete choice model
consistent with Eqs. (1)-(4). Looking at the optimization problem (17) s.t. (9) and (10) it is easy
to see that it can be written as
max
{pi(v)}Ni=1
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
pi(v) · (vi + logSi(p0))−
N∑
i=1
pi(v) logSi(p(v))
)
µ(v).
Then for each value v ∈ V, a solution to the RI program may solve following (pointwise) optimization
problem:
max
pi(v)∈∆
{
N∑
i=1
pi(v) · (vi + logSi(p0))−
N∑
i=1
pi(v) · logSi(p(v))
}
.
Then by Proposition 2, the previous problem is equivalent to
max
pi(v)∈∆
{
N∑
i=1
pi(v) · (vi + logSi(p0))−W ∗(p)
}
.
Then the conclusion follows at once.
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(iii) Let p∗(v) be a solution to the RI program. At the optimum (and taking λ = 1), it is easy to
see that the RI objective function in Eq. (17) can be written as:
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
p∗i (v)(vi + logSi(p
0))−
N∑
i=1
p∗i (v) logSi(p
∗(v))
)
µ(v).
By proposition 5 we know that p∗ = q(v˜). This latter fact implies that the RI program can be
rewritten as ∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
qi(v˜)v˜i −
N∑
i=1
qi(v˜) logSi(q(v˜))
)
µ(v).
Now, by proposition 2 it follows that W (v + logS(p0)) =
∑N
i=1 qi(v˜)v˜i − W ∗(q(v˜)). Thus the
optimum value of the RI program is given by:∑
v∈V
W (v + logS(p0))µ(v).

Proof of proposition 7.
For convenience, define zc(v) = exp(vc). Assume, towards a contradiction, that p
0
a > 0. Then
p0a = Ev
 Ha
({
zc (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
∑
b
Hb
(
{zc (v)Sc (p0)}Nc=1
)
 (30)
< Ev
 Ha
({
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
∑
b
Hb
(
{za (v)Sc (p0)}Nc=1
)
 (31)
= Ev
 za(v)Ha
({
Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
za(v)
∑
b
Hb
(
{Sc (p0)}Nc=1
)
 = Ev
 pa∑
b
pb
 = pa. (32)
The penultimate equality (32) follows from the homogeneity of H and H = S−1. The first inequality
(31) follows from cyclic monotonicity, which is a property of the gradient of convex functions. (See,
for instance, Rockafellar (1970, Thm. 23.5).) Since the surplus function W is convex, its gradient,
corresponding to the choice probabilities p(·) is a cyclic monotone mapping. Cyclic monotonicity
implies that〈
p
({
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− p
({
zc (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
,
{
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
− {zc (v)Sc (p0)}Nc=1〉 ≥ 0.
All the terms on the second term on the LHS are ≤ 0, except for the a-th term, which is equal to zero.
In order to satisfy the inequality, then, we must have pa
({
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
≥ pi
({
zc (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
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with the inequality strict with positive probability. Otherwise, we would have∑
i 6=a
{
pi
({
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− pi
({
zc (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)}
> 0
which leads to〈
p
({
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− p
({
zc (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
,
{
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
− {zc (v)Sc (p0)}Nc=1〉
=
∑
c 6=a
(
pc
({
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− pc
({
zc (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
))
∗ (za (v)− zc (v))Sc
(
p0
)
≤max
c6=a
[
(za (v)− zc (v))Sc
(
p0
)] ∗∑
c6=a
(
pc
({
za (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− pc
({
zc (v)Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
))
≤0
with the inequality strict with positive probability. Hence, we conclude that pa = 0. 
